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This paper examines the effect of the formalization of land property rights in the war against illicit crops,
using the case of Colombia. We argue that as a consequence of the increase in state presence and visibil-
ity, municipalities with a higher level of formalization of their land property rights witnessed a greater
reduction in the area allocated to illicit crops. We hypothesize that this is due to the possibility of obtain-
ing more benefits in the newly installed institutional environment when land is formalized, and the
increased cost of growing illicit crops on formal relative to informal land. We find that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the formality index for smallholders is related to a reduction in the share of munic-
ipal area allocated to coca crops of 0.101 percentage points. That is, the formalization of one additional
hectare of land with respect to small landholders in an average municipality in the year 2000 is associ-
ated with a decrease of approximately 1.4 hectares of land allocated to coca within that particular munic-
ipality, ceteris paribus. These results remain robust to a number of sensitivity analyses. Our findings
contribute to empirical evidence on the positive effects of formal land property rights and effective poli-
cies in the war on drugs.
 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The distribution and definition of land property rights play a
crucial role in the transition from an agricultural to an industrial
economy (Barraclough, 1970; Easterly, 2007). In most western
economies, a more formalized scheme of land property rights has
been associated with higher levels of investment, income growth,
accumulation of human and physical capital and poverty reduc-
tion, among other social and economic outcomes (Banerjee,
Gertler, & Ghatak, 2002; Besley & Burgess, 2000; Dercon &
Krishnan, 2010; Deininger & Nagarajan, 2009). By contrast, high
levels of informality might represent an important hindrance to
the development process (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006;
Barraclough, 1970; Dercon & Krishnan, 2010). Many scholars have
suggested that a lack of formal land rights could hinder law
enforcement by government bodies, increase social tensions, facil-
itate illegal recruitment, forced displacement and land appropria-
tion, and boost illegal activities in conflict areas (André &
Platteau, 1998; Grossman & Kim, 1995; Ibanez & Carlsson, 2010).Despite the empirical evidence on the social and economic out-
comes associated with either formal or informal land property
rights systems, relatively little attention has been placed on the
relationship between the strength of land property rights and illicit
activities.
In Colombia, on average, approximately 22 percent of all private
rural land has no formal title, of which 89 percent are small plots of
less than 20 hectares – ha. These territories are characterized pri-
marily by weak law enforcement, an abundance of natural
resources, and a high prevalence of poverty, which creates a per-
fect breeding ground for illegal activities such as coca cropping
(Dávalos et al., 2011). During the 1990s, Colombia became the lar-
gest coca producer in the world (Angrist & Kugler, 2008). In
response, the Colombian and US governments launched the pro-
gram Plan Colombia, which was intended to strengthen the military
power, social cohesion and justice. As a result, Colombia became a
major recipient of US military assistance (Dube & Naidu, 2015).
Nonetheless, despite the billions of dollars spent, the coca produc-
tion economy seemed hardly damaged. Instead, because of the
adaptive behavior of the coca growers, in 2009 nearly the same
amount of cocaine was being produced on only half of the land that
was being used for the cultivation of coca crops before the begin-
ning of Plan Colombia (GAO, United States Goverment
1 According to Mejía and Rico (2010), the average size of a coca field in 2002 was
2.2 ha, in 2008 around 0.6 ha. This implies that around 166,000 rural household were
involved in coca crop cultivation in 2008.
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strates the need to thoroughly understand which strategies were
more effective in reducing coca production, and under which
circumstances.
In this paper, we analyze the role of the level of formality of
land property rights in the ‘‘War on Drugs” in Colombia. We argue
that the low presence of the state in most of the Colombian regions
before 2000 boosted the spread of coca crops throughout the terri-
tory. Once the rule of law increased, attempts to reduce coca crops
were more effective in those municipalities with more formalized
land property rights. Two main mechanisms might explain this
relationship. First, improved institutional conditions due to the
increased state presence (e.g., Plan Colombia), could have been
more attractive to peasants with legal titles because they were able
to benefit more from alternative programs (both within Plan
Colombia and outside the scope of this counter-drug policy), for
example by using land as collateral to obtain credit, or by substi-
tuting illegal crops for low-risk cash crops, among others. We call
this the substitution mechanism. Second, there is an increase in
the cost of cultivating coca due to more severe sanctions. On the
one hand, formal ownership implies criminal responsibility for
landholders that grow coca on their land plot. On the other hand,
land titles inherently increase land value, ceteris paribus. Hence,
as the government expropriates landowners with coca crops from
their land, the cost associated with expropriation rises. This oper-
ates as a standard deterrence mechanism as proposed by Becker
(1968). In sum, we argue that improved land rights create microe-
conomic incentives to change risk-taking behavior once law
enforcement increases.
Our identification strategy exploits the plausibly exogenous
variation in the level of formalization of land property rights at
the municipal level provided by the ‘‘Program for Land Titling
and Modernization of the Registry of Deed and Cadastre.” This pro-
gram was a joint effort by the Colombian Government and the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). This initiative was
intended to increase the coverage of cadastral information and
the level of formalization of land property rights across the Colom-
bian territory. The program was implemented between 1995 and
2000 in about one-fifth of the Colombian municipalities, leading
to a plausible exogenous source of temporal variation in the level
of formalization in these municipalities for the following reasons.
First, it started a supply-driven formalization process for landown-
ers whose titles were not formally registered. Second, this process
was centralized and implied a minimum level of involvement by
the landowner. Third, the duration of the process until the resolu-
tion of the formalization process was driven by factors that are
arguably exogenous to unobserved characteristics that can be cor-
related with the presence of coca crops in a municipality. Impor-
tantly, since these municipalities were all subject to the same
program, for our sample the quality of the land tenure information
is reliable. Also, we expect measurement errors not to be correlated
with unobservables either.
There are several threats to our identification strategy. First,
increased levels of formalization could lead coca growers to
migrate to other municipalities where the formalization process
is slower to grow coca there, which would confound our effect.
Second, there may be omitted time variant productivity conditions
at the municipal level that might also explain the change in coca
crops. Third, the level of formalization of the land property rights
is correlated with the development process itself, and so our
results could be capturing a broader social phenomena that is also
time variant at the municipal level. Fourth, the government may
have deliberately targeted those municipalities that experienced
an improvement in land formalization through their other
counter-drug policies. In such a case, those policies would be con-
founding our results. We provide empirical evidence to rule outthese threats, as well as additional sensitivity analyses using alter-
native independent variables.
Additionally, we provide empirical evidence on a transmission
mechanism that could explain the relation: improved institutional
conditions allow peasants to benefit more from alternative legal
activities (i.e. substitution). We test this mechanism in two differ-
ent ways. First, by using information on coffee cropping, the most
important cash crop in Colombia, we test whether the change in
the level of formality of land property rights is positively correlated
with coffee growing. Such a correlation would suggest peasants
might be benefiting from this alternative crop. Second, we test
whether alternative development programs that were universally
implemented in coca growing municipalities persisted more in
places with improved land rights. Such a situation would
strengthen the argument that peasants could be benefiting more
from legal alternatives.
We use a data set of Colombian municipalities from 2000 to
2009. As a proxy for the level of formalization of land property
rights, we build an index based on the share of small plots
ð6 20 haÞ without legal deeds. We create the index using plot-
level census data from the Colombian Geographical Institute
Agustín Codazzi–IGAC, Spanish acronym–. We focus primarily on
these smaller plots, as the vast majority of coca is found to be pro-
duced on such land1 (Mejía & Rico, 2010). Often, the strength or
safety of property rights is measured through an index based on
the risk of expropriation (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001;
Knack & Keefer, 1995). Although having a formal title or deed does
not guarantee that a person is protected from becoming a victim
of expropriation when law enforcement is weak, we argue that
titling allows for the possibility of resorting to formal mechanisms
to regain lost land through judicial institutions. In addition, we use
information on coca crops provided by the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime–UNODC–and the Colombian Government.
We estimate a fixed effects model for the sample of municipal-
ities where the ‘‘Program for Land Titling and Modernization of the
Registry of Deed and Cadastre” took place and either have natural
conditions for cropping coca (i.e., an altitude of 500 to 2000 meters
above the sea level) or ever had coca crops during the period from
2000 to 2009. In addition to controlling for time-invariant munic-
ipal characteristics, this specification allows us to introduce differ-
ent linear and non-linear time trends that could bias our estimates.
Because of the highly endogenous relationship between the ‘‘War
on Drugs” and coca production, we cannot directly include controls
for law enforcement. Although this issue is partially addressed by
the inclusion of municipal-level fixed effects, we also include the
interaction between the time trend and the presence of military
bases of the government. One characteristic of the US military
aid in Colombia is that it is disbursed to specific military units that
operate from different military bases. Thus, one may expect that
those municipalities with military bases were more exposed to
the increase in law enforcement (Dube & Naidu, 2015).
Our findings suggest that stronger property rights structures
have a negative effect on the share of land allocated to coca crops.
We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the formality
index for small landowners is associated with a decrease in the
share of municipal area allocated to coca crops of 0.101 percent-
age points, on average. To put these numbers into perspective,
they imply that the formalization of one additional hectare of
land with respect to small landholders in an average municipality
in the year 2000 is associated with a decrease of approximately
1.4 hectares of land allocated to coca within that particular
municipality, ceteris paribus. This is a local effect for the sample
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Modernization of the Registry of Deed and Cadastre” that also
have natural conditions to grow coca. Moreover, we do not find
spillover effects on neighboring municipalities. Other sensitivity
analyses using different samples and measures of land formality
offer confirmatory results. Regarding the transmission mecha-
nism, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the for-
mality index for small land plot owners is associated with the
appearance of 77 new coffee fields, on average. We also find that
a one-standard-deviation increase in the formality index is asso-
ciated with an increase of about 40 percentage points regarding
the likelihood of having alternative development programs in
the municipality.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to provide
empirical evidence on the relationship between different levels
of formalization of land property rights and illicit activities such
as coca growing. Hence, our study contributes to the economic lit-
erature in two distinctive ways. First, we contribute to the debate
on the importance of institutions concerning micro- and macro-
economic and social performance. Second, our results provide
technical support in favor of policies focusing on the strength of
institutions as an effective alternative to counter illicit behavior
such as coca production. For the specific case of Colombia and
other drug producing countries, land rights formalization presents
an effective alternative to other policies such as aerial eradication,
which have been proven not only ineffective but also counterpro-
ductive. Indeed, Mejía, Restrepo, and Rozo (2017) find that spray-
ing one additional hectare with glyphosate is associated with a
decrease of up to 0.030 hectares of land cultivated with coca crops.
Even though both studies differ with respect to the sample of
municipalities and territories under study–which might limit a
direct comparison, the effect is more than an order of magnitude
larger.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the
economic framework of land property rights and illicit activities. In
Section 3 we provide a brief overview of the institutional context in
Colombia. Section 4 introduces the data and our identification
strategy. The results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.2. Land property rights and illegal behavior: an economic
framework
Land property rights form a key component of an institutional
setting, establishing the rules for the use of and access to land
(Dercon & Krishnan, 2010; North, 1990). A well-defined land
property rights scheme should guarantee a private, exclusive,
transferable, alienable, and enforceable right to appropriate any
rent or benefit from the land (Demsetz, 1967; Feder & Feeny,
1991). It therefore implies a social and political scheme to
enforce these rights. In most Western societies, formal titles or
deeds constitute a physical representation of a property rights
system (i.e., de jure), whereby the state enforces the complete
enjoyment of land rights. In contrast, in many developing coun-
tries, land property rights still fall within the realm of informal
customary law, which is often based on ethical or religious prin-
ciples. Within such a system, rather than the physical represen-
tation of land titles, people or communities hold symbolic and
intangible rights to land (i.e., de facto) (Besley, 1995; Dercon &
Krishnan, 2010). In general, these systems are considered less
efficient than their formal counterparts, due to their less strict
characteristics, in combination with weak law enforcement and
limited transferability (Besley & Persson, 2009; Deininger, Ali,
& Yamano, 2008; Demsetz, 1967; Feder & Onchan, 1987; Hafer,
2006).A number of positive economic and social outcomes are com-
monly associated with formal and well-defined land property
rights systems in rural and urban areas. First, several scholars
report positive effects on rural investment. Two mechanisms are
considered here. On the one hand, as a direct consequence of a
reduction in the risk of expropriation (i.e., decreased uncertainty),
the expected returns might increase. Consequently, peasants and
external investors are more inclined to invest in the short, medium
and long terms, resulting in higher productivity and therefore rural
welfare (Besley, 1995; Deininger et al., 2008). On the other hand,
because formal titles to land can be easily used as collateral, credit
markets are more accessible for land owners, increasing potential
investment (Deininger et al., 2008; Feder & Onchan, 1987).
Although these arguments are susceptible to endogeneity (i.e.,
more investment could incentivize a demand for improved land
rights), the results seem to be robust after controlling for this
potential bias (Besley, 1995). Second, formal land property rights
prompt efficiency in the land market. The marketability gains
could lead to an important increase in land transactions (Conning
& Robinson, 2007). This new dynamic modifies not only the equi-
librium prices in the land market but also matching efficiency in
the land rental markets, resulting in a significant increase in pro-
ductivity (Deininger & Chamorro, 2004; Macours, Janvry, &
Sadoulet, 2010). Third, in addition to the mechanisms highlighted
above, a growing body of evidence reveals positive effects on
income growth and the accumulation of human and physical cap-
ital (Besley & Burgess, 2000; Deininger & Nagarajan, 2009), poverty
reduction (Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010), labor supply (Field,
2007), political empowerment (Goldstein & Udry, 2008), reduction
in social confrontations (Albertus & Kaplan, 2013) and an increase
in the bargaining power of the less wealthy in a region (Banerjee
et al., 2002).
Nevertheless, formal land property rights schemes are not nec-
essarily the best option in every context. Multiple studies report
counter-evidence against the positive effects noted above
(Brasselle, Gaspart, & Platteau, 2002; Pande & Udry, 2006).
Brasselle et al. (2002) find in Burkina Faso that traditional, more
customary, communal and informal institutions create a good
small-scale investment climate just as well as their codified and
secure counterparts do. Deininger and Jin (2006) find similar
ambiguous evidence related to productivity and investment using
data from Ethiopia, arguing that the increased percentage of formal
land property rights through the number of planted trees had dis-
couraged productivity and enhanced investments such as terrac-
ing. Jacoby and Minten (2007) find for Madagascar that the
economic benefits from extending land titling would be minor
and would not exceed its implementation cost. Nonetheless, as
these authors note, these findings are due primarily to effective-
ness of the customary tenure and their informal enforcement
mechanisms (e.g., religious punishment), which are found to be
as effective as their formal counterparts only when well estab-
lished (Besley, Burchardi, & Ghatak, 2012; Brasselle et al., 2002;
Goldstein & Udry, 2008; Jacoby & Minten, 2007).
An important implication of the strength of land property rights
is the reduction in the risk of expropriation, which could affect
portfolio choice. The absence of titles or effective mechanisms to
enforce them deprives poor families of a valuable insurance and
saving tool that could provide protection during bad times and
retirement (see Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010 in an urban context).
Hence, squatters usually opt for other insurance alternatives, pre-
ferring a short time horizon and risky portfolio (Besley, 1995). This
might create opportunities for illicit behavior to emerge, especially
in rural areas with weak law enforcement and the natural condi-
tions to develop profitable and illegal crops. Nevertheless, little is
known about the potential implications of the strength of land
property rights for illicit behavior.
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institutional background
In Colombia, the land property rights system can be character-
ized as dual.2 On the one hand, a large portion of land plots with for-
malized titles were the result of land distribution during the colonial
period, as well as the various polices for the assignation of public
land during the last two centuries (Ibáñez & Muñoz-Mora, 2010).3
The remaining land stayed primarily informal due to the unplanned
expansion of the agricultural frontier. This dual and unequal scheme
has become not only an important hurdle to the development of the
region and country but also one of the main sources of social conflict
(LeGrand, 1988). The Colombian government has made several
attempts to resolve this duality in the property rights scheme.4 Nev-
ertheless, after multiple attempts to implement land reforms, the old
structure remained firmly in place Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder,
1995; Machado, 2009. Two explanations are primarily responsible
for this failure: (i) poor design and low state capacity and (ii) the
power of large landowners, who blocked and transformed the
reforms to their benefit (Ibáñez & Muñoz-Mora, 2010). Recently,
Law 160, issued in 1994, was designed to spur rural development
through the promotion of land markets, which conferred the respon-
sibility for clarifying property rights on the peasant. Supply-oriented
formalization programs, in which the state promoted titling, making
it easier for landowners to obtain titles, and in which the state ver-
ified and reconfirmed existing titles, have been rare, with the latest
one between 1995 and 2002. This program, called ‘‘Program for Land
Titling and Modernization of the Registry of Deed and Cadastre”, led
by the IDB and the Colombian government, gave over 250,000
households a formal title.5
The 1980s witnessed the rise of coca cartels, in a country torn
by political conflict with unresolved historical land issues.
Although Colombian drug dealers were initially drug intermedi-
aries rather than producers,6 during 1990s, coca crops rapidly
spread across all Colombian territories (Mejía & Rico, 2010).7 Several
facts explain this expansion. First, due to the effective policies to
counter drug production in Peru and Bolivia, Colombian drug dealers
were left with no other option than to find new locations for their
coca growing and producing activities (Angrist & Kugler, 2008). Sec-
ond, as demand for cocaine grew, which increased potential profits
of this illicit industry, illegal groups began participating actively in
the production of coca crops. The strategy of these groups was to
use most of the territories under their control for coca production,
where small-scale coca growers were obliged to sell their output2 Ample of literature can be found on land issues in Colombia. Ibañez and Munoz-
Mora (2010) provide a general overview of the different land institutions and policies
from the colonial period until the late twentieth century.
3 After independence, most of the colonial institutions remained in place, with the
land titles that originated during Spanish rule being enforced by the new sovereign
state (Machado, 2009). This set the initial conditions for land property rights in
Colombia, with large formalized land plots based on former semi-feudal structures
(Ibáñez & Muñoz-Mora, 2010; LeGrand, 1988).
4 For a detailed description of those policies, see Machado (2009) and Ibáñez and
Muñoz-Mora (2010).
5 This program was designed to consolidate and strengthen an open, transparent,
and efficient land market that would facilitate access to the financial system for urban
and rural property owners. Registered titles would be awarded to approximately
100,000 parcels of land in 200 rural municipalities and 150,000 parcels of urban
property in 50 municipalities (Colombian Goverment – IDB, 1997).
6 The cocaine production process usually consists of four stages: (i) growing and
cropping the coca leaves; (ii) the extraction of coca paste; (iii) the transformation
thereof into cocaine base; and (iv) the conversion of cocaine base into cocaine
hydrochloride, a process that, due to its complexity, usually takes place in local
laboratories. The final stage is trafficking or commercialization (Mejía & Rico, 2010).
7 Mejía (2010a) note: ‘‘In 1990, Peru had the largest number of hectares under coca
cultivation (about 62 percent of the total), and Colombia the lowest (14 percent). By
1999, these shares had completely reversed, with Peru having 21 percent of the total,
Bolivia, 12 percent, and Colombia 67 percent.”to these groups exclusively in return for protection and technical
support.8
The expansion of coca crop fields occurred primarily on the
agricultural frontier, where the lack of law enforcement, the weak
definition of land property rights, the abundant natural resources
and the high prevalence of poverty generated a perfect environ-
ment to establish the coca production industry, which is based
principally on small coca growers (i.e., small land plots)9 (Angrist
& Kugler, 2008; Dávalos et al., 2011; Mejía & Rico, 2010). While only
a small portion of total profits remains with the small coca growers,
this profit is relatively larger than that from any other alternative
crop (Mejía & Rico, 2010). Over time, Colombia has witnessed many
policies to reduce coca production, with Plan Colombia being the
most comprehensive.10 This program had three pillars: strengthen
military power, increase social cohesion and development, and
strengthen justice.11 The seizure of raw materials for coca produc-
tion, manual and aerial eradication of coca fields, land expropriation,
destruction of laboratories, interdiction of drug shipments and pro-
motion of alternative development programs were frequent tactics
under this policy (GAO, United States Goverment Accountability
Office, 2008; Mejía, 2010b). Plan Colombia was complemented by
an intense counter-insurgency policy, launched by President Alvaro
Uribe (2002–2010). Despite a meaningful increase in law enforce-
ment in all national territories12 and halting the expansion of coca
fields, the production side was hardly affected. In fact, nearly the
same amount of cocaine is being produced on half the land that
was being used for the cultivation of coca crops before the imple-
mentation of Plan Colombia (Mejía, 2010b).
These mixed results might be explained by a number of reasons.
First, because drug producers’ capacity to counteract anti-drug
policies is much larger than the capacity of drug traffickers, policies
were less effective on the production side (Mejía et al., 2017; Mejía
& Restrepo, 2008). Small coca growers appeared to be able to learn
and adapt rapidly, thereby evading the rule of law and re-
allocating their crops (Mejía & Rico, 2010; Mejía & Restrepo,
2008). Second, it seems to suggest that small coca growers follow
a persistent risk-taking behavior pattern, whereby coca cultivation
becomes inelastic to increases in perceived risk. Ibanez and
Carlsson (2010) note that this behavior cannot be explained solely
by monetary reasons. Non-monetary variables, such as experience
with coca cultivation, legitimacy of authorities, and religion, could
also be important factors in this decision-making procedure on the
part of coca growers. Hence, an increase in law enforcement is effi-
cient if and only if the policies generate microeconomic incentives
that alter the risk-taking behavior of coca growers, thereby restor-
ing the link between small coca growers and the state. In such a
context, the strength of land property rights might have had an8 Furthermore, rebels minimize economic risks and cost by providing technical
assistance, a minimum price and collection of yield at the farm gate. (Anecdotal
evidence from an interview with a demobilized high-rank member of FARC, July
2010) (Moreno-Sanchez, Kraybill, & Thompson, 2003).
9 As Dávalos et al. (2011, p. 1225) note: ‘‘The expansion of coca itself is an
indication that these municipalities constitute the agricultural frontier, where settled
land ends and new inroads begin. If so, these municipalities should have a greater
proportion of their surface in forest because socio-political integration and economic
development have produced massive forest loss in Colombian history.”
10 Plan Colombia originated between 1998 and 1999 as a bilateral cooperation
program between the governments of Colombia and the United States to counter
illegal drugs and organized crime. The program demanded combined average annual
spending of US$ 1.7 billion (2011 US dollars) between 1999 and 2005 (GAO, United
States Goverment Accountability Office, 2008).
11 For a complete technical overview and evaluation of Plan Colombia, see Mejía
(2010b) and Mejía and Restrepo (2008), or from an political perspective, see GAO,
United States Goverment Accountability Office (2008).
12 Before 2002, nearly 5 percent of Colombian municipalities (i.e., 50) did not have a
police presence. During the government of President Uribe, the presence of the police
and army increased in 18 percent of Colombian municipalities (Cortés, Vargas,
Hincapie, & del Rosario Franco, 2012).
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gal crops in Colombia.
4. Empirical framework
(a) Data
We use a ten-year longitudinal data set for all Colombian
municipalities covering the period 2000–2009.13 Based on remote
sensing, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime–UNODC–
and the Colombian government provide the net area allocated to
coca crops in each Colombian municipality over time.14
As our main variable of interest, we use an original index for the
level of formalization in land property rights for small plots
ð6 20 haÞ,15 based on the cadastral information provided by the
Colombian Geographical Institute Agustín Codazzi – IGAC, Spanish
acronym–.16 Cadastral data is collected through plot censuses, which
gather information on the owner, the physical characteristics of the
land and, specifically, on the registration of any formal title or deed
at the local registry offices;17 this allows us to categorize every plot
as formal or informal. Thereby, we define our land tenure formality
index for smallholders 620 ha), f i;t , as:
f i;t ¼
Area ðhaÞ of formal properties for small landholders ð6 20 haÞi;t
Private cadastral area ðhaÞ for small landholders ð6 20 haÞi;t
The cadastral municipality information can be in two different
states: (i) If no data collection has been performed, people are
obliged to declare their land themselves without any technical ver-
ification. This creates very vague information known as a fiscal
cadastral; (ii) once the plot census has taken place, all information
on the location, ownership, physical characteristics and size is ver-
ified by a technician. From this point onward, municipalities are
considered to have a cadastral formation. Because it is impossible
to perform a plot census every year, owners are obliged to report
any land transactions, in a process called cadastral conservation.
In order to keep the information up to date, Colombian regulation
dictates that municipalities must conduct a new plot census within
five years after being formed or updated. Whereas the first plot
census or cadastral formation is a centralized decision made by13 We exclude the municipalities in the department of Antioquia, as the information
on property rights is managed by a descentralized agency and are not available for the
same period of time. We will include as a robustness check.
14 Because coca fields could change within the same year, UNODC and the
Colombian government use a cut-off date at the end of each year to estimate the
area under coca cultivation. Some potential measurement errors need to be taken into
account. First, while satellite images are corrected for meteorological conditions,
some bias such as mountain slopes and the false identification of abandoned fields as
active ones could persist. Second, the method for data collection on the coca fields
could rule out the detection of short term coca plantations. Some of these
disadvantages are partially addressed with auxiliary information from the Colombian
government and correction through verification overflights (UNODC, 2011).
15 There is an open debate on the definition of the size of small plots in developing
countries (among others, see Berry, 2010; Carter, 1984 & Eastwood et al., Eastwood,
Lipton, & Newell, 2010). We opt for a conservative definition of small farms, using 20
ha as the threshold. Nonetheless, the results are qualitatively similar using other
thresholds such as 610 ha and 65 ha.
16 This institution is responsible for collecting and managing information for all
municipalities in Colombia with the exception of Medellín, Bogotá, Cali and all
municipalities in the department of Antioquia, which are decentralized. For further
information on this process, see Ibáñez, Muñoz-Mora, and Gafaro (2012). Data from
Medellín, Bogotá and Cali is mainly urban, hence is out of the scope of our analysis.
Antioquia’s data set is available only from 2006 onward. We use the data from IGAC
only and thus we exclude those municipalities from the analysis. There should not be
any correlation between unobserved characteristics of those municipalities in
Antioquia and our variables of interest, hence such exclusion is not expected to bias
our results. In any case, we re-estimate our equations including this information and
do not find an important differences.
17 Despite that, under Colombian law, a tenant without a title could claim some
basic rights to the land, only registered titles are considered formal.the Colombian central government, the updating process is gener-
ally a combined decision of local and central authorities.18 Given
the structure of the cadastral information, several concerns might
arise. First, as additional information after the official plot census
is self-reported by the owner, this could generate measurement
error due to miss-reporting. That is, our index could be under-
estimating the actual situation of land property rights due to
unobserved owner characteristics that might disincentivize the
registration of new titles or deeds. Second, given the high demands
in terms of the organization costs required for the updating process,
only well-motivated politicians will promote such policies. Further-
more, illegal actors or large owners could manipulate the local insti-
tutions to block the implementation of titling programs or the
updating of the cadastral information to maintain the status quo
(Fergusson, 2013). This might generate an important selection prob-
lem through which a systematic difference could arise between
municipalities with different cadastral information quality, which
could be correlated with the persistence of coca crops.
To address the measurement problem, we focus our analysis in
a sample of municipalities that were subject to cadastral formation
with the ‘‘Program for Land Titling and Modernization of the Reg-
istry of Deed and Cadastre”.19 This program had two main objec-
tives (Colombian Goverment – IDB, 1997): (i) increase the
coverage of the cadastral information in municipalities with fiscal
cadastre; and (ii) improve the formalization of land property rights
throughout the Colombian territory. The first objective of the pro-
gram allows us to control for the measurement problem. In particu-
lar, since these municipalities were collectively selected to conduct
their first plot census, our estimates will be based on a homogeneous
sample with reliable land tenure data. The second objective will be
important for our identification strategy and we will elaborate more
on this in the next section. In addition to restricting our analysis to
this sample of municipalities, we focus only on those that either
have natural conditions to crop coca (i.e., an altitude 500 to 2000
meters above sea level) or ever had coca during the period 2000–
2009.
As a result of the program, about one-fifth of all Colombian
municipalities, primarily those located at the former agricultural
frontier, experienced their first plot census. Graph 1 depicts the
timing of the first plot census of all Colombian municipalities that
either have natural conditions to crop coca or ever had such crops
between 2000–2009. Our baseline sample is highlighted in the
grey square. There are a number of municipalities that had their
first plot census after 1990 and before the program started. Since
we cannot guarantee that such cadastral formation processes are
exogenous to unobserved characteristics of the municipalities,
nor be certain that data quality is homogeneous for all of them,
we exclude them from our analysis.20
Regarding the policies of Plan Colombia, we use information pro-
vided by UNODC and the Colombian government. For the interdic-
tion policies we consider two variables: number of kilograms of
coca leaves seized and number of laboratories destroyed.21
Furthermore, we include the number of hectares eradicated both18 For further details on the process and the different administrative duties of the
local and central governments, see Resolutions 2555 of 1988 and 70 of 2011 of the
Geographical Institute Agustín Codazzi.
19 During this period, various policies and programs were launched to improve the
coverage of the cadastral information and the formalization of land property rights.
For instance, Law 388 of 1997 stated that the central government is obliged to
perform a plot census for all fiscal cadastral land plots within one year.
20 Municipalities with low-quality cadastral information generally have an impor-
tant difference between geographical and cadastral areas, which means that not all
plots were visited by the cadastral census. In the municipalities that were selected in
our sample, both the mean and median of the cadastral areas is 97 percent of the
physical area, which reconfirms the quality of the data.
21 As we noted above, there are different stages in the coca production process; we
aggregate all types of laboratories destroyed without distinction.
Graph 1. Timing of first plot census in Colombian municipalities. Notes: We include all municipalities that either have natural conditions to crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to
2000 mts over sea) or ever had coca. We excluded Antioquia. Data source: IGAC, 2013, 2013.
J.C. Muñoz-Mora et al. /World Development 103 (2018) 268–283 273by aerial spraying and manually.22 Regarding the alternative devel-
opment policies, we use the presence of Forest Warden Family pro-
grams23 and Productive Projects programs.24 Finally, we include
additional geographic and socio-economic controls. These include
the presence of military bases, indigenous or forest protected areas,
distance to national capital, altitude and municipality area.
Our baseline sample considers all municipalities for which the
cadastral information was formed between 1995 and 2000 (i.e.
those subject of the program) and either have natural conditions
to crop coca, or ever had coca during 2000–2009. Table 1 reports
the descriptive statistics. Data is at the municipal-year level. Our
sample includes information for 192 municipalities covering the
ten-year period. Total hectares of coca crop fields per municipality
are highly concentrated in small areas, as shown by the high stan-
dard deviation and the fiftieth and ninetieth quantiles. This is also
reflected in the low share of municipal area devoted to coca crops.
Smaller land plots are statistically significant less formalized than
the medium-size land plots, on average. The statistics of the Plan
Colombia variables reflect the policies as elaborated upon in the
context section, with a focus on aerial spraying, anti-narcotic oper-
ations and manual eradication. The alternative development pro-
jects received only minor attention in the period of observation.
The four remaining variables complement the data description,
revealing large differences in land quality over the municipality
land, but low shares of public and indigenous land, as well as nat-22 This information is the sum of the hectares manually eradicated by national
policy, army and the mobile groups of eradication – GME, Spanish Acronym.
23 This program was implemented in seven phases: (i) Phases I-II: three years of
intervention during 2003–2006, with 36,222 households in 35 beneficiary munici-
palities; (ii) Phase III: three years of intervention during 2006–2009, with 17,406
households in 25 beneficiary municipalities; (iii) Phase IV: one and a half years of
intervention during 2007–2009, with 33,546 households in 39 beneficiary munici-
palities; (iv) Phase V: one and a half years of invention during 2008–2010, with 19,743
households in 24 beneficiary municipalities; (v) Phase VI: two and a half years of
intervention with 7,401 households in 5 beneficiary municipalities; and (vi) Phase VII:
two and a half years of intervention with 7,759 households in 21 beneficiary
municipalities (UNODC & Colombian Goverment, 2011). In our analysis, we include
municipalities that benefited during phases I to IV.
24 In 1996, the Colombian Government launched the National Program for
Alternative Development – PLANTE, Spanish acronym – which sought to support
productive projects in coca-affected municipalities. After 2003, all of these projects
were embedded in the module of Alternative Development programs of Plan
Colombia. Therefore, while officially Plan Colombia only began supporting projects
in 2003, information on productive projects is available since 2000.ural reserves. We also report the statistics on the time-invariant
covariates.
Graph 2 depicts the kernel distribution of our main variable of
interest for two years: 2000 and 2009. We see that the formality
index for small-holders is concentrated on the right-hand side, at
approximately 0.95. Notwithstanding only minor changes between
the points of observation (i.e., the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test could
not reject the null hypothesis), we confirm the increasing tendency
over time towards formality.
Graphs 3 and 4 depict the spatial distribution of the average
share of municipality area allocated to coca crops and the number
of years with coca crop presence over the period 2000–2009,
respectively. All Colombian municipalities are included, but we
highlight our baseline sample. In general, we find that, on average,
in most of the coca-producing municipalities, less than 0.02 per-
cent of land was allocated to coca production, with few cases in
the upper tercile. When we consider the average number of years
of growing coca, we find greater spatial heterogeneity. At first
glance, we observe no spatial patterns between the coca producers
included in our sample and those excluded.
Table 2 looks at the difference in the ‘‘War on Drugs” between
coca-producing municipalities excluded and included in our base-
line sample. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality in the
share of municipal area allocated to coca crops. Yet, we do find a
systematic difference in the number of years with the presence
of coca crops, which shows less persistence in municipalities that
are included in our sample. Because of the universal nature of all
other policies of the ‘‘War on Drugs”, we do not find any systematic
differences between the excluded municipalities and our baseline
sample.
(b) Identification strategy
The empirical strategy we pursue in this paper can be described
as follows. Before Plan Colombia was launched, the low presence of
the state in most of the Colombian territories fostered the spread of
coca crops in all areas. However, once the rule of law was increased
due to the implementation of Plan Colombia, reducing coca crops
was more effective in those municipalities with a higher level of
formal land property rights. Two main mechanisms might explain
this relation. First, improved institutional conditions due to the
increased state presence could be more beneficial and therefore
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Observations Mean Std. Deviation Q50 Q90
Share of municipality area on coca fields (100%) 1920 0.064 0.366 0.000 0.103
Formality land property rights for small-holders (620 ha) 1920 0.831 0.198 0.908 0.978
Formality land property rights for medium-holders (>20 ha–6200 ha) 1920 0.844 0.184 0.908 0.991
Share of private cadastral area on small plots (620 ha) 1920 0.427 0.268 0.401 0.816
Aerial Spraying (ha) 1920 201.463 1043.879 0.000 0.000
Manual coca erradication (ha) 1920 134.924 723.497 0.000 85.000
Number of laboratories destroyed 1920 2.457 16.676 0.000 3.000
Seizure of coca leaves (kg) 1920 755.862 6114.339 0.000 350.000
Municipal Development Index 1920 45.481 15.164 43.443 66.800
Government Military bases (yes = 1) 1920 0.016 0.124 0.000 0.000
Protected areas (forest) (yes = 1) 1920 0.188 0.390 0.000 1.000
Indigenous protected areas (yes = 1) 1920 0.177 0.382 0.000 1.000
Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (1993) 1920 48.291 16.789 44.200 72.600
Distance to capital (km) 1920 70.976 55.376 57.540 125.558
Altitude (Height above mean sea level) (mts) 1920 1242.432 605.624 1359.000 1875.000
Municipality area (ha) 1920 62261.146 1.65e + 05 23300.000 1.25e + 05
Notes: We include all the municipalities that were part of the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre” and either have natural
conditions to crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to 2000 mts over sea) or ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. We excluded Antioquia. Data source: National Census (1993); UNODC,
2013; IGAC, 2013.
Graph 2. Kernel distribution for the Formality Land Property Rights for small-holders (620 ha) in 2000 and 2009. Notes: We include all the municipalities that were part of
the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre” and either have natural conditions to crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to 2000 mts over sea) or
ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. Information from Antioquia’s cadastral information is only available only from 2006 onward, we only include it as robustness check. Two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [p-value = 0.640]. Data source: IGAC, 2013; Antioquia’s Regional Government, 2013.
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title allows them to use the land more in this setting, become more
visible, and take better advantage of alternative programs. This not
only holds for the programs offered through Plan Colombia but also
in general through the positive externalities of having formal prop-
erty rights (e.g., higher productivity, investment, social capital),
allowing the peasant to choose low-risk and legal crop substitutes.
We call this the substitution mechanism. Second, as highlighted,
formalization implies a cost increase of cultivating coca because
of the sanctions one could face when cultivating coca on formal
land. On the one hand, a formal owner of a land plot growing coca
crops is charged formally with a criminal offense when discovered.
Furthermore, the government expropriates coca growers with a
formal title when caught and, since formal deeds inherently
increase land value, the cost of expropriation increases for the
peasant. In sum, we argue that improved land rights create microe-
conomic incentives to change risk-taking behavior once law
enforcement is increased.We exploit the variation in the level of formalization for those
municipalities subject to the ‘‘Program for Land Titling and Mod-
ernization of the Registry of Deed and Cadastre.” As we noted ear-
lier, the program had two main objectives: (i) increase the
coverage of the cadastral information in municipalities with fiscal
cadastre; and (ii) improve the formalization of land property
rights throughout the Colombian territory. For identification pur-
poses we benefit from the second objective. In particular, we take
advantage of the following three characteristics (Colombian
Goverment – IDB, 1997). First, it initiated a supply-driven formal-
ization process for landowners whose titles were not formally
registered. Under a traditional demand-driven formalization pro-
cess, only self-motivated peasants would formalize their owner-
ship claiming the deeds directly. This implies that changes in
the level of formalization in a municipality can be explained by
unobserved characteristics of the peasants that lead them to
claim–or not–a title. However, the fact that the formalization
processes that were initiated by the program were supply-side
Graph 3. Spatial distribution for the average share of municipality area on coca fields over 2000–2009. Notes: Mean = 0.05%; Std Dev = .296. The map includes all Colombian
municipalities. The baseline sample refers municipalities that were part of the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre” and either
have natural conditions to crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to 2000 mts over sea) or ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. Information from Antioquia’s cadastral information is only
available from 2006 onward, we only include it as robustness check. Data source: UNODC, 2013; IGAC, 2013; Antioquia’s Regional Government, 2013.
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onal to individual characteristics.
Second, all formalization procedures within the program came
from the central government without interference of local politi-
cians, and implied a minimum level of involvement by the land-
owner. Because the common process to obtain a title for one’s
land implies heavy involvement and decisions by the squatters,
some peasants could decide to remain informal to crop coca, or
to delay the process. If this would be the case, municipalities with
more suitable conditions for growing coca would show less varia-
tion in their formality index than would municipalities with less
coca presence. The ‘‘Program for Land Titling and Modernization
of the Registry of Deed and Cadastre” organized the formalization
processes centrally, requiring little involvement of the land-
holder.25 Such centralization efforts reinforce the exogeneity argu-25 Indeed, the program was replaced at the beginning of the 2000s by the ICARO
initiative, which received support by the World Bank and was more ambitious in
scope. This initiative sought to massively cross validate cadastral and registry
information to ease the formalization procedures.ment with respect to unobserved characteristics of the peasants
that could be correlated with their willingness to crop coca.
Third, the duration of the formalization processes was mainly
caused by factors that are arguably exogenous to unobserved char-
acteristics that could also be correlated with the presence of coca
crops. The duration of this procedure varies depending on the com-
plexity of the clarification of the title. Whereas in some cases the
clarification of the property rights lasted a few years as these titles
were easily verifiable, in other it lasted several years as many insti-
tutions need to be involved in the process. For instance, in those
cases in which the land plots were located within public idle land,
or those land plots with measurement errors concerning the bor-
ders or the total area of the land, required the involvement of
specific centralized agencies that have representatives at the
department or sub-regional levels. Thus, we do not expect the
requirements of the different agencies participating in the pro-
cesses, or the productivity levels of those bureaucrats involved,
to be endogenous to unobserved characteristics at the municipal
level that might be time variant.
Yet, even if the ‘‘Program for Land Titling and Modernization of
the Registry of Deed and Cadastre” provides a plausibly exogenous
Graph 4. Spatial distribution for the number of years with coca fields over 2000–2009. Notes: Mean = 1.592; Std Dev = 3.179. The map includes all Colombian municipalities.
The baseline sample refers municipalities that were part of the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre” and either have natural
conditions to crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to 2000 mts over sea) or ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. Information from Antioquia’s cadastral information is only available from
2006 onward, we only include it as robustness check. Data source: UNODC, 2013; IGAC, 2013; Antioquia’s Regional Government, 2013.
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concern is related to the selected sample of municipalities that
we include in our analysis (i.e. those subject to the program that
also possess the natural conditions to crop coca). More specifically,
a systematic difference might be present between our sample and
other municipalities. To test this, we run a basic quasi-random
assignment test to check for the presence of any systematic differ-
ences between our baseline sample and the excluded municipali-
ties. In particular, we estimate the following equation:
ci ¼ a0 þ a1Di þ v i ð1Þ
where ci represents the characteristics of a given village, Di is a
dummy variable indicating whether the municipality had its first
census plot between 1995 and 2000, and v i stands for the error
term clustered at the department level. If this cadastral formation
process is uncorrelated with municipality characteristics, then a1
would be small and statistically insignificant for all characteristics.
We use information from the 1993 Colombian National Census and
other socioeconomic information for the period 1993–2000provided by the data set from Universidad de los Andes – Colombia.
Table 3 shows the results for 19 different characteristics. We find
that municipalities included in our sample were closer to the
national capital (km), were more populated, had a lower incidence
of poverty (1993) and less presence of protected areas. In contrast,
we do not find differences in other characteristics related to vio-
lence or institutional strength, among other characteristics. To
account for these systematic differences that may form a potential
source of bias due to the absence of complete randomness, we will
include these factors as controls in our specifications.
We study the effects of land formality on coca crops by estimat-
ing the following equation:
Coca cropsi;t ¼ a Formality landi;t þ ci þ ct þ Xi;tbþ ui;t ð2Þ
where the sub-index i refers to the municipality and t the time per-
iod (i.e., t ¼ 2000; . . . ;2009). The dependent variable, Coca cropsi;t , is
the proportion of municipality area allocated to coca. Our main
variable of interest is the index of formal land property rights for
small plots (620 ha), Formality landi;t . Our hypothesis is that, on
Table 2
Difference on War on Drugs between coca producers municipalities excluded and coca producers municipalities included in the baseline sample.
Excluded Our sample Difference
Share of municipality area on coca fields (100%) 0.220 0.185 0.036
[0.888] [0.374] [0.040]
(1485) (670)
Number of years with coca crops 6.522 6.164 0.358⁄
[2.185] [0.029] [0.164]
(1485) (670)
Aerial Spraying (ha) 506.291 571.799 65.508
[-0.902] [0.367] [72.660]
(1485) (670)
Manual coca erradication (ha) 451.618 335.060 116.558⁄
[2.088] [0.037] [55.824]
(1485) (670)
Number of laboratories destroyed 6.710 6.391 0.319
[0.284] [0.777] [1.126]
(1485) (670)
Seizure of coca leaves (kg) 2178.212 1832.656 345.557
[0.694] [0.487] [497.581]
(1485) (670)
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, number of observation in parenthesis. ⁄ Significant at 10%, ⁄⁄ significant at 5%, and ⁄⁄⁄ significant at 1%. Two-side mean test significance
reported. We only include ‘‘Coca Producers” (i.e. at least one year with coca between 2000 and 2009). Baseline refers to municipalities that were part of the ‘‘Program for land
titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre”. Excluded are those municipalities that were not part of the mentioned program. We excluded Antioquia. Data
source: UNODC, 2013; IGAC, 2013.
Table 3
Quasi-random assignment test (i.e ci ¼ a0 þ a21ðBaselineSampleÞ þ v i).
a 2 Std. errors Observations
Distance to Bogota (km) 40.067⁄ [18.787] 558
Altitude (Height above mean sea level) (mts) 168.733 [84.470] 558
Population (1993) 11389.639⁄⁄⁄ [2559.591] 548
Poverty (%) (1993) 0.032⁄ [0.016] 533
Income Gini Index (1993) 0.002 [0.005] 533
School Attendance (1993) 0.601 [0.653] 530
Unsatisfied Basic Need -UBN- (1993) 13.034⁄⁄⁄ [2.496] 558
Rural population index (Rural/Urban) (1993) 1.321⁄ [0.545] 547
Average Homicide Rate (by 100 person) (1990–2000) 0.168 [0.086] 558
Average Number of attacks to civilians (1990–2000) 0.026 [1.090] 548
Average Number of massacres (1990–2000) 0.053 [0.059] 558
Presence of Agrarian Bank (yes = 1) 0.103 [0.138] 542
Presence of High-School (yes = 1) 2.889 [1.583] 542
Average public income per-capita (average 1990–2000) 0.004 [0.004] 548
Presence of indigenous communities (yes = 1) 0.121⁄ [0.053] 558
Presence of afrocolombian communities (yes = 1) 0.055 [0.052] 558
Presence of National Park (yes = 1) 0.063 [0.047] 558
Presence of Protected Forest Area (yes = 1) 0.075⁄⁄ [0.023] 558
Hectares allocated to coffee (1997) 479.388⁄⁄⁄ [126.545] 558
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets,clustered by department level. ⁄ Significant at 10%, ⁄⁄ significant at 5%, and ⁄⁄⁄ significant at 1%. All regressions included constant. a2
refers the point estimate for each evaluated outcome ðciÞ (i.e ci ¼ a0 þ a21ðBaselineSampleÞ þ v i , where 1ðBaselineSampleÞ is a dummy variable indicating whether the
municipality was part of the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre”).Data source: National Census (1993) and CEDE (2015).
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ity had a relatively lower share of municipality area allocated to
coca crops (i.e., a < 0).
We control for various potential unobservable characteristics.
First, ci stands for fixed municipality conditions (e.g., natural con-
ditions, roads, among others) that could be correlated with the
presence of coca crops, making some municipalities more prone
than others to grow illegal crops.26 Second, we control for common
shocks across years using year fixed effects, gammat . Third, we
include a vector of control variables that vary across specifications,
Xi;t . This vector includes three sets of controls. First, geographic con-
trolswhereby we intend to control for unobservable temporal trends
associated with geographic characteristics such as: distance to cap-26 Therefore , h ighly formal ized munic ipal i t ies before 2000 ( i .e . ,
Formality landi;j;t ¼ 18t) and municipalities with a fixed level of formality (i.e.,
Formality landi;j;t ¼ c8t) will be naturally excluded from our identification strategy.ital, average rainfall 1970–2000, and the presence of indigenous
reserved areas and forests. Empirical evidence has suggested that
the persistence of coca crops in recent years is correlated with the
presence of particular natural conditions and the existence of pro-
tected areas (UNODC, 2011). Second, we include coca-market and
law enforcement controls. Because of the high endogeneity between
the ‘‘War on Drugs” and coca production, we cannot directly include
controls for law enforcement. To control for this, we include coca
region-year fixed effects to control for common events that affected
all municipalities within a given region in a specific year27 and the
interaction of a time trend and the presence of government military
bases. One characteristic of the US military aid in Colombia is that it
is disbursed to specific military units that operate from different27 UNODC (2011) identify seven regions in which production, techniques and input
prices in the coca market are homogeneous. These zones are usually the geographic
unit of policy implementation.
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presence of military bases were more exposed to the increase in law
enforcement (Dube & Naidu, 2015). Third, we include socio-economic
controls to control for other local development. In particular, we
include the temporal interaction trend of the Unsatisfied Basic Needs
Index (1993) and a Municipal Development Index. Finally, ui;t is
clustered on two levels: municipality and department-year. This
two-way clustering allows us to improve the inference because the
standard errors are corrected for any bias associated with time-
variant department-level characteristics (Cameron, Gelbach, &
Miller, 2011).
We propose a set of robustness checks. We begin by introducing
a new set of covariates in an effort to explore alternative explana-
tions for our estimates. As the UNODC (2011) notes, one of the
main challenges of the war on drugs in Colombia is the mobility
of coca growers; hence, our results could be explained by the fact
that coca growers move to other locations, leaving their original
locations. Therefore, a reduction in coca crops in one municipality
could be explained by an increase in coca crops in neighboring
areas. While we already control for time-variant unobservable
effects within coca regions, we include three variables in an effort
to capture the spillover effects of such behavior. In particular, we
include the change in the presence of coca crops between the cur-
rent and the subsequent year considering three distances: 25 km,
50 km and 100 km.28
We also test the sensibility of our results using different sam-
ples and outcome measures. First, we repeat our baseline results
using all municipalities that had their first plot census, first, before
1990 and, second, since 1990. Although these samples might be
extremely biased by the quality of the land information, the
microeconomic incentives provided by the improved land property
rights should persist. Second, we drop the coca-producing depart-
ments that were not coca producers during the 1990s (Angrist &
Kugler, 2008). It may be the case that the reduction in coca crops
is associated with less-suitable conditions for planting coca crops
and not with improved land property rights. If it were the case,
our results should disappear when we constrain our sample to
regions traditionally regarded as coca-producing regions. Third,
as the strength of property rights system is strongly related to
the development process itself, our results could be capturing a
broader social phenomenon. Therefore, we re-estimate our specifi-
cation without those municipalities that had an important
improvement during the period 2000–2009. We use information
provided by the Colombian National Planning Department, which
categorizes Colombian municipalities into six different levels
according to their development states (1 more development – 6
less development). Thus, we exclude those municipalities that
improved their status between 2000 and 2009. Fourth, it may be
the case that the government specifically targeted those munici-
palities with improved levels of formalization of their land prop-
erty rights with their other counter-drug policies. To study
whether this was the case, we repeat our estimations replacing
the outcome variable, the presence of coca crops, by three alterna-
tives: number of destroyed coca laboratories, seizure of coca leaves
and the number of hectares eradicated either manually or by aerial
spraying.
Finally, we run a placebo test by changing our variable of inter-
est. Coca is produced primarily on small plots, but to test this state-
ment, we re-estimate our baseline specification using two
alternative definitions of the level of formalization of land property
rights in terms of size. Following the same logic as with small land-
holders, we calculate the formality of land property rights index for28 Distances are computed using the main urban center of each municipality. We
choose to use this instead of the centroid of the municipality polygon because it
provides a better representation of real distance. We estimate the Euclidean distance.medium landholders (>20 ha-6200 ha) and large landholders
(P20 ha). Because the two mechanisms presented in this paper
through which the strength of property rights may reduce coca
crops apply primarily to small landholders, we expect to see no
effect on the coca crop presence for medium and large landholders.
(c) Testing the substitution mechanism
We argue that improved land property rights of small landhold-
ers provide microeconomic incentives to change risk-taking behav-
ior once law enforcement is increased. We hypothesize two
mechanisms are responsible for this: greater benefits from substi-
tutive legal activities and higher costs associated to cropping coca
once the plot is formalized. We empirically test the mechanisms
using two alternative outcome variables. First, using information
from the National Coffee Information System (SICA, Spanish Acro-
nym) provided by the National Federation of Coffee Growers in
Colombia, we use a proxy for the number of new coffee fields per
year in each municipality. Coffee is the most important cash crop
in Colombia, and the plants grow in similar natural conditions as
coca (altitude, climate, soil, etc.), making them perfect substitutes.
If peasants with formalized land rights have more incentives to
grow legal substitutes, we expect that improved land property
rights for smallholders will be related to an increase in new coffee
fields.
Second, we test whether the alternative development projects
are more persistent in municipalities with improved land rights.
These development projects offered a variety of other agricultural
legal alternatives to peasants. Hence, we expect that the persis-
tence of alternative development programs will be correlated to
higher levels of formalization of the land property rights.5. Empirical results
Our findings show a significant negative relationship between
the level of formalization of land property rights and the number
of hectares allocated to coca crops per municipality. These results
are robust to the introduction of additional controls, the use of dif-
ferent samples and the performance of a placebo test. The empiri-
cal evidence indicates that this effect is presumably due to the
substitution mechanism.
(a) Baseline results
Table 4 presents our baseline results using a panel of Colombian
municipalities over the period from 2000 to 2009. We present four
different specifications including the different controls in Xi;t . The
point estimate of the formality index of property rights for small
landowners is negative and significant in all specifications. Fur-
thermore, the magnitude of the coefficient remains relatively
stable as we include more controls, which suggests a robust rela-
tionship between informality in land tenure and the presence of
coca crops. In general, we find that a one-standard-deviation
increase in the formality index for smallholders (i.e., 0.198 percent-
age points) is related to a reduction in the share of municipal area
allocated to coca crops of 0.101 percentage points. To put these
numbers into perspective, they imply that the formalization of
one additional hectare of land with respect to small landholders
in an average municipality in the year 2000 is associated with a
decrease of approximately 1.4 hectares of land allocated to coca
within that particular municipality, ceteris paribus .29 This is a local29 In 2000, on average, a municipality that covers an area of 62,262 hectares, had
around 10.4% of its total area allocated to coca crops and 82% of the total area for land
small holders with formal title.
Table 4
Baseline results.
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Dependent variable: share of municipality area on coca fields (100%)
Formality land property rights for small-holders (620 ha) 0.141⁄⁄⁄ 0.122⁄⁄ 0.118⁄⁄ 0.101⁄⁄⁄
[0.050] [0.054] [0.049] [0.035]
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920
Municipalities 192 192 192 192
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Specific Trend No Yes Yes Yes
Coca-Market and Law Enforcement Controls No No Yes Yes
Socio-Economic Specific Trend No No No Yes
Notes: ⁄ Significant at 10%, ⁄⁄ significant at 5%, and ⁄⁄⁄ significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by municipality and by department-year. All regressions
include constant. Geographic Specific Trend include: (i) Distance to Capita  time trend; (ii) Average rainfall 1970–2000  time trend; (iv) Protected areas (forest) (yes = 1) 
time trend; and, (iv) Indigenous protected areas (yes = 1)  time trend. Coca-Market and Law Enforcement Controls include: (i) Government Military bases (yes = 1)  time
trend; and, (ii) Coca regions  time trend. Socio-Economic Specific Trend include: (i) Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (1993)  time trend; and, (ii)Municipal Development Index.
Sample is composed by all the municipalities that were part of the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre” and either have natural
conditions to crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to 2000 mts over sea) or ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. We excluded Antioquia. Data source: UNODC, 2013; IGAC, 2013.
Independent variables were standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Table 5
Baseline results including potential spillover effects.
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Dependent variable: share of municipality area on coca fields (100%)
Formality land property rights for small-holders (620 ha) 0.141⁄⁄⁄ 0.122⁄⁄ 0.118⁄⁄ 0.100⁄⁄⁄
[0.050] [0.054] [0.049] [0.035]
Change on coca crops around 25 km 0.005 0.006⁄ 0.005⁄ 0.007⁄
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Change on coca crops around 50 km 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Change on coca crops around 100 km 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920
Municipalities 192 192 192 192
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Specific Trend No Yes Yes Yes
Coca-Market and Law Enforcement Controls No No Yes Yes
Socio-Economic Specific Trend No No No Yes
Notes: ⁄ Significant at 10%, ⁄⁄ significant at 5%, and ⁄⁄⁄ significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by municipality and by department-year. All regressions
include constant. Geographic Specific Trend include: (i) Distance to Capita x time trend; (ii) Average rainfall 1970–2000  time trend; (iv) Protected areas (forest) (yes = 1) 
time trend; and, (iv) Indigenous protected areas (yes = 1)  time trend. Coca-Market and Law Enforcement Controls include: (i) Government Military bases (yes = 1)  time
trend; and, (ii) Coca regions  time trend. Socio-Economic Specific Trend include: (i) Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (1993)  time trend; and, (ii)Municipal Development Index.
Sample is composed by all the municipalities that were part of the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre” and either have natural
conditions to crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to 2000 mts over sea) or ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. We excluded Antioquia. Data source: UNODC, 2013; IGAC, 2013.
Independent variables were standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
J.C. Muñoz-Mora et al. /World Development 103 (2018) 268–283 279effect for the sample of municipalities included in the ‘‘Program for
Land Titling and Modernization of the Registry of Deed and
Cadastre” that also have natural conditions to grow coca. That is,
once the state became more present and visible after 2000, munici-
palities with larger improvements of their land property rights for
small land plots had significantly less coca crops.
(b) Sensitivity analyses
In this section, we present a set of sensitivity analyses to con-
firm the robustness of our results. One one hand, we re-estimate
our baseline results using additional controls, different samples,
and alternative outcomes. On the other hand, we perform a pla-
cebo test to check whether our results are driven by general trends.
First, to account for alternative explanations for the reduction of
coca crops, we consider additional covariates. In particular, we
include three variables in an attempt to capture the spillover effect
of the policies implemented through Plan Colombia. Table 5presents the results. The point estimate of the formality index for
smallholders remains similar in magnitude and statistically signif-
icant. Yet, we do not find any significant spillover effects at any dis-
tance. These results are relevant in light of different patterns of
responses a peasant may have following the implementation of
Plan Colombia policies. If it is the case that the response to these
policies prevails over changes in the formality index in a munici-
pality, we would have found a loss of significance in our coefficient
of interest. The rationality of this threat is straightforward with, for
instance, aerial spraying policies.
Second, we repeat the estimations using alternative samples.
This allows us to check the sensitivity of our results regarding pro-
ductivity conditions to grow coca, a broader development phe-
nomena, and the quality of the data. These alternative samples
include (i) as a benchmark, we retain our baseline results; (ii)
municipalities that either had their first census plot or the last
cadastral update after 1990; (iii) municipalities that either had
their first census plot or the last cadastral update after 1980; (iv)
Table 6
Robustness check: different samples.
Baseline
Sample
Cadastral Census
since 1990
Cadastral Census
since 1970
Without non-traditional
coca producers
Without developed
municipalities
With
Antioquia
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Dependent variable: share of municipality area on coca fields (100%)
Formality land property rights for
small-holders (620 ha)
0.101⁄⁄⁄ 2.185⁄ 2.127⁄ 0.231⁄⁄ 0.098⁄⁄⁄ 0.116⁄⁄⁄
[0.033] [1.150] [1.137] [0.102] [0.030] [0.035]
Observations 1920 3680 3740 440 1780 2228
Municipalities 192 368 374 44 178 269
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Specific Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coca-Market and Law Enforcement
Controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-Economic Specific Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: ⁄ Significant at 10%, ⁄⁄ significant at 5%, and ⁄⁄⁄ significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by municipality and by department-year. Baseline
Sample (Column I) refers to all the municipalities that were part of the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre” and either have
natural conditions to crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to 2000 mts over sea) or ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. Cadastral Census since 1990 (Column II) includes municipalities
that had either first census plot or updating process after 1990. Cadastral Census since 1970 (Column III) includes municipalities that had either first census plot or updating
process after 1970.Without non-traditional coca producers (Column IV) includes the baseline sample without departments with coca production during nineties.Without
developed municipalities (Column V) includes the baseline sample without those municipalities that improved their development status between 2000–2009 based on the
National Planning Department (DNP, Spanish Acronym).With Antioquia (Column VI)We include the municipalities from Antioquia from 2006 onwards. Geographic Specific
Trend include: (i) Distance to Capita  time trend; (ii) Average rainfall 1970–2000  time trend; (iv) Protected areas (forest) (yes = 1)  time trend; and, (iv) Indigenous
protected areas (yes = 1)  time trend. Coca-Market and Law Enforcement Controls include: (i) Government Military bases (yes = 1)  time trend; and, (ii) Coca regions  time
trend. Socio-Economic Specific Trend include: (i) Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (1993)  time trend; and, (ii) Municipal Development Index. Sample is composed by all the
municipalities that were part of the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre” and either have natural conditions to crop coca (i.e.
altitude 500 to 2000 mts over sea) or ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. Data source: UNODC, 2013; IGAC, 2013; Antioquia’s Regional Government, 2013. Independent
variables were standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Table 7
Robustness check: falsification test.
Dependent variable: share of municipality area on coca fields (100%)
Panel A: Medium landholders (>20 ha–6200 ha)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Formality land property rights for median-holders (P20 ha–6200 ha) 0.118 0.137 0.156 0.153
[0.204] [0.206] [0.217] [0.208]
Observations 1920 1920 1920 1920
Municipalities 192 192 192 192
Panel B: Large landholders (P20 ha)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Formality land property rights for large-holders (P20 ha) 0.022 0.013 0.015 0.015
[0.017] [0.020] [0.020] [0.022]
Observations 1541 1541 1541 1541
Municipalities 192 192 192 192
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Specific Trend No Yes Yes Yes
Coca-Market Specific Trend No No Yes Yes
Socio-Economic Specific Trend No No No Yes
Notes: ⁄ Significant at 10%, ⁄⁄ significant at 5%, and ⁄⁄⁄ significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by municipality and by department-year. All regressions
include constant. Geographic Specific Trend include: (i) Distance to Capita  time trend; (ii) Average rainfall 1970–2000  time trend; (iv) Protected areas (forest) (yes = 1) 
time trend; and, (iv) Indigenous protected areas (yes = 1)  time trend. Coca-Market and Law Enforcement Controls include: (i) Government Military bases (yes = 1)  time
trend; and, (ii) Coca regions  time trend. Socio-Economic Specific Trend include: (i) Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (1993)  time trend; and, (ii)Municipal Development Index.
Sample is composed by all the municipalities that were part of the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and cadastre” and either have natural
conditions to crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to 2000 mts over sea) or ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. We excluded Antioquia. Data source: UNODC, 2013; IGAC, 2013.
Independent variables were standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
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(v) a sample without developed municipalities; and (vi) a sample
including the cadastral information from Antioquia. Table 6 shows
the results. Notwithstanding an important increase in the magni-
tude of the coefficient for some samples, possibly due to bias asso-
ciated with data quality,30 the point estimate of the formality index30 The major changes in the point estimate are in samples that include municipal-
ities with relatively old cadastre data, which are in columns (II) and (III).for small landowners remains negative and statistically significant,
confirming the robustness of our results.
Third, to analyze further whether our findings correspond to a
general effect of institutional improvement, we perform a placebo
test. In this test we adapt the formalization index for land property
rights to medium-sized landholders. Table 7 shows the results. As
expected, we find no significant effect for the point estimate of the
formality index in all regressions, which again confirms the robust-
ness of our results. As discussed in Section 3, coca fields are mainly
operated by smallholders, and we would not expect any significant
J.C. Muñoz-Mora et al. /World Development 103 (2018) 268–283 281change in the presence of coca crops in a municipality following an
improvement in formalization for medium-sized landowners.
Fourth, to study if the government deliberately targeted other
counter-drug policies at those municipalities that experienced an
improvement in land formalization, we re-estimate our results
using alternative outcomes. In particular, we study whether there
is any correlation between changes in formality and enforcement
efforts on destruction of laboratories, coca eradication and seizure.
Table 8 presents the result. We find no correlation between the for-
mality index for small-holders and both enforcement activities
under conventional levels of statistical significance, which con-
firms the robustness of our results.
(c) Mechanisms
Tables 9 show the results of testing the substitution effect using
coffee fields and the presence of alternative development programs
as outcome variables, respectively. We re-estimate the same spec-
ifications as in our baseline results.Table 8
Mechanisms: ‘‘War on Drugs” and land property rights.
Dep. Var.: Num
laboratories d
(I)
Formality land property rights for small-holders (620 ha) 2.232
[3.133]
Observations 1920
Municipalities 192
Year Fixed Effect Yes
Municipality Fixed Effect Yes
Geographic Specific Trend Yes
Coca-Market Specific Trend Yes
Socio-Economic Specific Trend Yes
Notes: ⁄ Significant at 10%, ⁄⁄ significant at 5%, and ⁄⁄⁄ significant at 1%. ⁄ Significant at 1
clustered by municipality and by department-year. All regressions include constant. At th
of program of Forest Warden Families and/or alternative productive projects in a givin
eradicated either manually or by aerial spraying. At the Column II, Seizure of coca leaves
Specific Trend include: (i) Distance to Capita x time trend; (ii) Average rainfall 1970–2000 
protected areas (yes = 1)  time trend. Coca-Market and Law Enforcement Controls include
trend. Socio-Economic Specific Trend include: (i) Unsatisfied Basic Needs Index (1993) 
coffee producer municipalities that were part of the ‘‘Program for land titling and moder
crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to 2000 mts over sea) or ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. W
were standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Table 9
Substitution mechanisms.
D
n
(
Formality land property rights for small-holders (620 ha) 7
[
Observations 1
Municipalities 1
Year Fixed Effect Y
Municipality Fixed Effect Y
Geographic Specific Trend Y
Coca-Market Specific Trend Y
Socio-Economic Specific Trend Y
Notes: ⁄ Significant at 10%, ⁄⁄ significant at 5%, and ⁄⁄⁄ significant at 1%. Robust standard e
include constant. Geographic Specific Trend include: (i) Distance to Capita  time trend; (i
time trend; and, (iv) Indigenous protected areas (yes = 1)  time trend. Coca-Market and
trend; and, (ii) Coca regions  time trend. Socio-Economic Specific Trend include: (i) Unsati
In column I, sample is composed by all the coffee producer municipalities that were p
cadastre” and either have natural conditions to crop coca (i.e. altitude 500 to 2000 mts o
UNODC, 2013; IGAC, 2013. Independent variables were standardized to have mean zeroRegarding the presence of coffee fields, the point estimate on
the formality index for property rights for small landholders is pos-
itive and significant in all specifications. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the formality index for smallholders is associated with
the appearance of up to 77 new coffee fields, on average. These
results therefore favor our mechanism whereby small farmers
might find substitutive crops whenever land is formalized. Like-
wise, on the persistence of alternative development programs we
also find a positive and statistically significant relationship. These
alternative development programs consisted mainly in the imple-
mentation of productive projects–with no formalization compo-
nents, and were universally implemented in coca growing
municipalities Mejía, 2010b. Hence, this positive correlation may
be explained by two main factors. First, improved institutional
conditions are more attractive to coca growers with legal titles,
and therefore, those development programs were more persistent.
Second, a decrease in coca crops creates the need for such pro-
grams. Despite being unable to disentangle these two explanations,
either is in favor of the substitution mechanism.ber of
estroyed
Dep. Var.: Coca hectares
eradicated
Dep. Var.: Seizure of
coca leaves (kg)
(II) (III)
85.521 296.980
[379.574] [857.179]
1920 1920
192 192
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
0%, ⁄⁄ significant at 5%, and ⁄⁄⁄ significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in brackets,
e Column I, Alternative Development programs takes one when there is presence
g municipality. At the Column II, Coca hectares eradicated is the sum of hectares
(kg) is the sum if all the Seizure of coca leaves in the giving municipality. Geographic
time trend; (iv) Protected areas (forest) (yes = 1)  time trend; and, (iv) Indigenous
: (i) Government Military bases (yes = 1)  time trend; and, (ii) Coca regions  time
time trend; and, (ii) Municipal Development Index. Sample is composed by all the
nization of the registry of deed and cadastre” and either have natural conditions to
e excluded Antioquia. Data source: UNODC, 2013; IGAC, 2013. Independent variables
ep. Var.: Number of
ew coffee fields
Dep. Var.: Presence of Alternative
Development programs
I) (II)
6.920⁄⁄ 0.405⁄⁄⁄
37.009] [0.106]
540 1920
54 192
es Yes
es Yes
es Yes
es Yes
es Yes
rrors in brackets, clustered by municipality and by department-year. All regressions
i) Average rainfall 1970–2000  time trend; (iv) Protected areas (forest) (yes = 1) 
Law Enforcement Controls include: (i) Government Military bases (yes = 1)  time
sfied Basic Needs Index (1993)  time trend; and, (ii)Municipal Development Index.
art of the ‘‘Program for land titling and modernization of the registry of deed and
ver sea) or ever had coca during 2000 to 2009. We excluded Antioquia. Data source:
and standard deviation one.
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This article provides empirical evidence on the influence of the
level of formalization of land property rights on the presence of
illegal crops in Colombia. Despite the empirical and theoretical
evidence on the effects of well-defined land property rights, little
is known about the importance of these crucial institutions in the
context of illicit behavior. This is particularly relevant in a context
of a large-scale war on drugs, as in Colombia, where the interac-
tion between a persistent drug economy and a dual land property
rights scheme has fostered the spread of illegal crops across the
territory.
We use a panel data set of municipalities spanning from 2000 to
2009, containing detailed information on coca crops, land titling,
and the implementation of Plan Colombia policies. We exploit the
temporal variation in land formalization for a sample of municipal-
ities that had their first cadastral census performed between 1995
and 2000. During this period, the Colombian government, along
with the Interamerican Development Bank, launched a centralized
initiative to increase the coverage and quality of the cadastral
information. This program led to a change in land formalization
that is arguably exogenous to unobserved municipal
characteristics.
We argue that the attempts to reduce coca crops with the
implementation of Plan Colombia were more effective in those
municipalities with more formalized land property rights. Two
mechanisms might explain this relationship. On the one hand,
land formalization creates an institutional setting that allows
peaseants to benefit more from legal alternatives (i.e. substi-
tution effect). On the other hand, it increases the cost of
growing coca due to more severe sanctions. Our results sug-
gest that there is a negative and statistically significant rela-
tion between land formalization and the presence of coca
crops. In particular, we find that a one-standard-deviation
increase in the land formality index is associated with a
reduction of 0.101 percentage points in the area allocated
to coca. A number of sensitivity analyses provide confirma-
tory results. We also provide evidence on the substitution
mechanism.
To put these numbers into perspective, they imply that the
formalization of one additional hectare of land with respect to
small landholders in an average municipality in the year 2000
is associated with a decrease of approximately 1.4 hectares of
land allocated to coca within that particular municipality, ceteris
paribus. The most comparable study to this paper on the eradica-
tion of coca crops is Mejía et al. (2017). They find that spraying
one additional hectare of land with glyphosate is associated with
a reduction of up to 0.030 hectares of land allocated to coca crops.
Since aerial spraying of coca crops also has counterproductive
effects (Camacho & Mejia, 2017), and manual eradication policies
as well,31 and land formalization is often associated with positive
externalities regarding a number of development outcomes
(Banerjee et al., 2002; Besley & Burgess, 2000; Dercon &
Krishnan, 2010; Deininger & Nagarajan, 2009), we see our results
as favoring a different approach to reduce coca crops in Colombia:
land formalization.
Our mechanisms are embedded in the property rights frame-
work and, consequently, institutions in general. In this sense, our
results also contribute to the more general literature on improved
land institutions, development and growth.31 Up to mid 2017, about 25% of all land mine victims in Colombia were manual
eradicators, as reported by the Counter-Land Mines Program of the Colombian
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